51本色

In 2009, I was interested in studying the phenomenon of M-Pesa as a legal scholar鈥攋ust a year after its launch and intense rollout. My standpoint enabled me to see the initial regulatory paradoxes that M-Pesa presented. In 2010, I began my PhD, exploring what a regulatory framework should look like. My analysis focused on the complexities presented by the storage and transfer of customer funds within mobile money systems. Central to were themes of financial regulation, consumer rights, financial stability, conceptualising 鈥榝inancial inclusion鈥�, and the meaning of 鈥榖anking the unbanked鈥�. At the time, the study was significant, in understanding the contractual tensions between mobile money users and Safaricom, a non-bank entity, which provided services akin to a traditional bank鈥檚 deposit system鈥攜et did not appear to be subject to the same regulatory restraints as conventional banks. Crucially, banks and financial institutions had historically dominated much of the financial system, through practices due to colonialism. Therefore, M-Pesa caused much upheaval to established banks, but simultaneously provided hope for the excluded. Various actors extended this new hope, in the 鈥榮uccess鈥� narrative of M-Pesa. Its beneficial use as a storage and transfer system was extolled as , and the restatement of its trajectory was and continues to be modelled across the developing world. The global development and digitalisation agenda have subsumed M-Pesa鈥檚 pervasive influence, both valorising the pathways to 鈥榙evelopment鈥� and 鈥榠nnovation鈥� through FinTech with a singular aim of 鈥榝inancial inclusion.鈥�

As a result, Kenya has become the site of contestation for overwhelming empirical research, interest, and knowledge production, particularly by Western scholars and institutions. A 鈥榞old rush鈥� has emerged, and the scramble for knowledge extraction has intensified across academic disciplines and across methodologies. Studies from Ghana, Senegal and Kenya dominate. The study of 鈥榙evelopment鈥� in all its iterations has gained a new development. However, much of the ways in which mobile money (M-Pesa) and FinTech are discussed and framed demonstrates a Western understanding of the everyday lives of the Kenyans who use it. Scholars, activists, and proponents often situate the premise of its use as being between two paradigms: advancing through the enhancement of global development aims, and its function as a tool that includes Kenyans in extractive cycles of financialisation. Both of these are true.

Despite this, I proffer that Kenyans have built M-Pesa into the bespoke mobile money platform it is today. By built, I mean the socio-technical relations created through its use鈥攖he ingenious ways in which Kenyans have consumed, negotiated, and adapted to it, weaving between and within the formal and informal. They have combined the analogue and digital, representing the ways in which people on the financial frontier live.  However, the voices of the people within the platforms are often excluded in the discourse in research and industry: the collective agency, advocacy for rights, and the grassroots struggle in challenging existing exploitive capitalist conditions and mutually co-constitutive structures, amidst the subjectification from 鈥榓bove鈥� through foreign actors and 鈥榳ithin鈥� through the state in the digital age. Therefore, this piece asks how might the voices of the people be centred as decolonising Fintech narratives?

How the people experience digitalisation

Much of the intellectual inquiry into Africa begins from a presumption that the only exciting research is that of failing structures, markets, governments, and systems. The only versions of Africa worth reading about are poor, violent, sickly, and hungry鈥攁nd often these versions are seen through the altruism of international organisations and governments. The persistent assumption that Africa needs Western perspectives to understand itself is deeply problematic. The narrative is that, in Africa, nothing succeeds out of its own merit without centring . This framing is true in many ways, as the emergence of the Kenyan colony alongside the construction of the railway destined for Uganda dispossessed Africans of their ancestral lands, propelling them into commercial farming and wage labour, while sowing divisions among ethnic groups. This dispossession introduced shifts in cultural identities through the diffusion of Christianity and the English language. The digital line embodies a new dimension of this transformation into a new digital coloniality (Coleman 2019). As the railway was a tangible emblem of imperial domination, the digital line serves as a symbol of its legacy. It exerts a gravitational pull on the past, compelling it to align with a singular (imperial) vision of the future. This digital paradigm shift, like the railway鈥檚 historical impact, is not uniform in its effects: it has complex consequences for Kenyans.

From M-Pesa to Uber, how Kenyans live their lives is mediated through platforms and digital infrastructures: financial services, transport , public health, and . As with the railway lines, digital lines are transposing the same paradigm of where economic and political centres are and continue to be concentrated鈥攁nd the concentration lies with a few. They are shifting labour, democracy, power, and creativity, as well as leading to socio-spatial inequalities, remaking citizenship, identity and the State.

Similarly, the intertwining of Africa鈥檚 neoliberal economic restructuring and China鈥檚 demand for African resources is another source of 鈥� narratives. High global commodity prices, particularly for oil, prompted a search for new sources of raw materials, boosting African GDP and investment. However, Africa鈥檚 investor-friendly policies鈥攄ue to privatisation (a product of strictures of Structural Adjustment Programs) and deregulation, as well as China鈥檚 economic liberalisation and its pursuit of African resources to fuel its own rapid expansion鈥攈ave shaped this growth. China has become Africa鈥檚 top trading ally, and the export of African raw materials has dramatically increased. In the first decade of the 2000s, Africa鈥檚 growth rate outpaced that of East Asia. However, this new scramble has spilled over to militarised competition for resources. Africa has 鈥榬isen鈥� for but for global capital, yet wealth is still concentrated and not distributed.

In Kenya, the 鈥榯he Silicon Savannah鈥� moniker obfuscates these complexities. The name is framed towards a Eurocentric understanding, reifying the notion that Kenya can neither exist on its own merit, nor deploy its own agency, and must always be in comparison to an established 鈥榮uper鈥� power. It is often as if Africa must be viewed through the lens of the West to explain itself. It is within this frame, particularly in the digital age, that asks, 鈥榃hat changes when we start with people rather than the structures? There is agency. There is creativity, there is negotiation鈥�.  I would add that there is also resistance.

Countries in Africa are doing much more than just surviving. Resistance is infused in these narratives. It is represented in our everyday lives: the ethical dilemmas that ensue from and .

Kenyans understand that the development (Kopf 2021) was and continues to be about creating an infrastructure that primes the capacity of the 鈥榚lite鈥� class to accumulate and smooth away those inefficiencies that hamper the capacity of global capital to continue exploitation. Sold as public goods, but always private gains鈥攑ost-colonial nation building involves mega infrastructures intertwined with commercialization. To illustrate, M-Pesa鈥檚 founding demonstrates the political capture that allowed its (continued) flourishing. Additionally, the serves as an example of where the inserted itself into the nascent technology scene, leveraging Kenya as a stronghold of global capital. The State has displayed an unwavering commitment to attracting foreign investment, even at the expense of inadequately enforced labour laws that fail to protect workers鈥� rights. These situations have profound implications for the lives of the new class of gig economy workers, and through this priming, the law remains silent, enabling an environment for abuse.

Furthermore, many business models (such as Sama, Meta/Facebook, , and Uber) depend heavily on such an environment: one that sustains precarious work conditions, algorithmic control over workers, and deliberate violations of local labour laws. Kenyans have sought against such companies over redundancies, working conditions, and . Workers in Kenya assert their control by understanding their , both in the services they provide and data extraction. Similarly, M-Pesa鈥檚 initial adoption in 2007 was premised on the proposal, which exploited the norm of making frequent remittances through familial social networks. This layered onto the spatiality occasioned by colonialism, redistributing households blurring the formal and informal. Since then, Safaricom has asserted its dominance, providing a critical digital financial infrastructure relied upon during crises鈥攂e they contentious elections, disasters, or emergencies. They have built infrastructural intimacies, difficult to disentangle. Morphing product offerings, consolidating functions beyond telecommunications, Safaricom has further entrenched itself into savings and , creating predatory overdraft products, and inviting for fraud and other criminal opportunities鈥攁ll the while, enjoying regulatory protection from the State. Kenyans, and Africans more broadly recognise that the prevailing economic landscape is oriented towards commodities rather than technology. The continent is underpinned by existing infrastructural deficits, precluding technology-centric market development. Consequently, the most successful technological innovations in these regions are those that directly enhance the fundamental aspects of trade. This is exemplified by the predominance of FinTech solutions, particularly payment systems, which serve as critical enablers of basic commercial transactions, thereby reflecting the intersection of technology with the primary market dynamics of the region. 

Africa is not a lab (for 鈥榬esearch鈥� extraction)

Further, a significant portion of the existing research on FinTech and digital finance in Africa is predominantly by Global North researchers鈥攕upposedly focused on 鈥楢frica鈥�, but mainly discussing Kenya, Nigeria, or South Africa. Discussions on technology diffusion in Europe or North America normally focus on a single country, as places to be understood on their terms. This is never a consideration when talking about Africa. The dangers of a single oversimplified 鈥楢frican鈥� story persist, essentialising the African experience. The idea of having 鈥楩inTech in Africa鈥� editorials, collapsing 54 states into one single volume is peculiar. These clusterings are often devoid of intricacies and understanding; small samples are enough to generate findings and claims of regional expertise, mostly by Global North researchers. Regional variations are ignored, and geopolitics and social / cultural factors that shape socio-economic and political dynamics are overlooked. Africans can spot the flaws: a misspelled local name, a misinterpreted phenomenon. When discussing African countries, states are either often absent, or victims of circumstances beyond their control. When scholars go to Africa, they are looking for very good data into which they can impart their Western theories and ideologies. Such research portrays passive recipients of seemingly benign digital interventions or innovations: fodder for research. Life happens to Africans, who are not shaped or guided by their imaginations. These methodologies often oversimplify and homogenise Africa as a single entity.

There are certainly power differentials in researching FinTech that reify these narratives. For instance, Western expertise is perceived as objective or neutral, as they study and extract for themselves. Drawing epistemic lines, as Pereira (2014) stated, 鈥榯he modern foreign鈥�, Roy (2023) confirms, 鈥榩lays a key role, in strengthening claims and legitimacies locally, even as it reproduces the hegemony of Western theorisations and limits the flourishing of local knowledge against the framework of colonial logics and neoliberal demands鈥�. Kenyans are acutely aware of being researched in this sense鈥攍ike gig workers, producing dual value by both being the subjects of research and the producers of data for Western scholarship. Kenyans understand that their knowledge and tacit expertise have been expropriated by various stakeholders and 鈥榚xperts鈥欌�攎inimised, invisibilised, in support of Global North academics. In addition, the elite capture of FinTech expertise, subsumed by those who want to advance their careers with this 鈥榥ew鈥� development鈥攁ll while reproducing the power imbalances they seek to research, enabling epistemic injustice.

鈥楢frican鈥� research is relegated, subordinated, precarious鈥攖he voices of Kenyans forced to capitulate to becoming research assistants only, never leading the research. Similarly, Angela (2021) traces the rise of a 鈥榥ew鈥� idealised persona within Kenya鈥檚 research landscape, by examining how Kenya鈥檚 鈥楾echpreneur鈥� has been shaped by imperial logic that persists in seemingly autonomous ventures. Global capital and transnational geopolitics play out within Kenya, where the researchers are also the researched鈥攂ut this construction of the Kenyan Techpreneur is an extension of the apparatus that drives and crafts the African into an entrepreneur as a form of social security, abdicating the State from its duties (Elyachar 2005) The ways in which Africans are moulded into productive economic agents鈥攊n this case constructing the 鈥楩inTechpreneur鈥欌�攁re barely addressed, despite them being a heuristic device for researchers to gain a deeper understanding.

What space exists for the African scholar 鈥榯rapped in an existential dialectic of correcting misrepresentations of Western scholars on the flawed assumption that this advances the decolonisation agenda鈥� (Serenkuma 2024)? How can we challenge these narratives, and critically assess the knowledge produced about Africa鈥攁nd in this case Kenya鈥攚hile acknowledging its complex and diverse history, rather than solely viewing it as a site of trauma, and recast it in our own terms? What counter-narratives are there of pain and sympathy, as well as things we traditionally understand as the global neo-colonial capitalist encounter? What frameworks exist to shape how we produce knowledge regarding politics, strife and struggles related to ethnicity, gender, and class in digital 鈥楢frica鈥�, or even Kenya? How do these discussions navigate power dynamics, and manifest forms of resistance, when talking about digital finance in Africa?

As asks, 鈥榃hy don鈥檛 you research Africa with her people? Why don鈥檛 you ask them what Africa they want to research?鈥�

is a legal scholar based at Warwick Law School, University of Warwick. Her scholarship considers financial systems and practices that enable people to flourish despite marginality and global limits.

Image: By Sara Mehrgut

This post is part of the mini-blog series Decolonising for Whom? Recentring grassroots struggles and voices in the 鈥榙ecolonising fintech鈥� narrative and the ongoing blog series Decolonizing Economics.

References

Coleman, Danielle, 鈥楧igital Colonialism: The 21st Century Scramble for Africa through the Extraction and Control of User Data and the Limitations of Data Protection Laws鈥� (2019) 24 Mich J Race & L 417.

Wainaina, Binyavanga, 鈥極ne Day I Will Write About This Place鈥� (2011) London: Granta.

Fleming, P, 鈥楾he Human Capital Hoax: Work, Debt and Insecurity in the Era of Uberization鈥� (2017) 38 Organization Studies 691

Kessi, Shose, Marks, Zoe, & Ramugondo, Elelwani, 鈥楧ecolonizing African Studies鈥� (2020) 12:3 Critical African Studies 271

Martina Kopf (2021): Binyavanga Wainaina鈥檚 Narrative of the IMF-generation as Development Critique, Journal of African Cultural Studies

Mama, A, 鈥業s It Ethical to Study Africa? Preliminary Thoughts on Scholarship and Freedom鈥� (2007) 50(1) African Studies Review 1

Malala, J.(2017). Law and Regulation of Mobile Payment Systems: Issues arising 鈥榩ost鈥檉inancial inclusion in Kenya. Routledge.

Mbembe, A, 鈥楩uture Knowledges and their implications for the decolonisation project. The politics of knowledge鈥� (2019).

Natile, S, 鈥楧igital Finance Inclusion and the Mobile Money 鈥淪ocial鈥� Enterprise: A Socio-Legal Critique of M-Pesa in Kenya鈥� (2020) 45(3) Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung 74

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J, 鈥業ntellectual imperialism and decolonisation in African studies鈥� (2023) Third World Quarterly.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, SJ, Seesemann, R, & Vogt-William, C, 鈥楢frican studies in distress: German scholarship on Africa and the neglected challenge of decoloniality鈥� (2022) 57(1) Africa Spectrum 83.

Okune, A, 鈥楶ostcolonial Objectivity: Reaching for Decolonial Knowledge Making in Nairobi鈥� (2021).

Pereira, Maria do Mar, 鈥楾he Importance of Being 鈥淢odern鈥� and Foreign: Feminist Scholarship and the Epistemic Status of Nations鈥� (2014) 39(3) Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 627.

Prah, KK, 鈥樷�淗as Rhodes Fallen? Decolonizing the Humanities in Africa and Constructing Intellectual Sovereignty鈥濃�� In Unpublished Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAF) Inaugural Humanities Lecture, HSRC, Pretoria, October 20 (2016).

Roy, Srila, 鈥楩rom travel to arrival鈥� in The Routledge Companion to Intersectionalities (Routledge 2023).

Serunkuma, YK, 鈥楧ecolonial Dilemmas: The Deception of a 鈥淕lobal Knowledge Commonwealth鈥� and the Tragedian Entrapment of an African Scholar鈥� (2024) Africa Spectrum

Van Doorn, N and Badger, A, 鈥楶latform Capitalism鈥檚 Hidden Abode: Producing Data Assets in the Gig Economy鈥� [2020] 52(5) Antipode 1475鈥�1495