
In recent years, the rise of platform monopolies such as Google, Amazon, Meta, and Microsoft has sparked a growing discourse among scholars and public intellectuals, many of whom describe these developments through the lens of a supposed return to feudal structures. This narrative, often labeled as techno-feudalism or digital feudalism, suggests that contemporary digital capitalism is no longer driven primarily by labor exploitation, but by rent extraction and control over digital infrastructures (Varoufakis, 2021).
Prominent left-leaning thinkers such as Yanis Varoufakis, Mariana Mazzucato, McKenzie Wark, Jodi Dean, David Arditi, and Robert Kuttner have employed the techno-feudalism framework to highlight the increasing asymmetries of power and wealth in the digital age.
The term has gained significant traction, not least because of its rhetorical force and capacity to evoke historical imaginaries of servitude, hierarchy, and immobility (Morozov, 2022). Yet its growing popularity has also introduced analytical imprecision, with many adopting the label as a buzzword rather than engaging critically with its implications. At first glance, the metaphor appears appealing: today鈥檚 tech giants resemble lords presiding over digital fiefdoms, extracting value from users and workers who have little choice but to submit to the rules of the platform. However, this article argues that such analogies are conceptually flawed and politically misleading.
Drawing on the tradition of critical political economy, this paper challenges the techno-feudalism thesis by contending that the digital economy remains deeply embedded within capitalist logics, particularly in its monopolistic and financialized forms. What we are witnessing is not a reversion to feudal relations, but an intensification of capitalist accumulation strategies under new technological conditions. Platform monopolies do not derive power from land ownership or inherited status, but from their capacity to commodify data, enforce algorithmic control, and monetize access to essential infrastructures鈥攅specially through cloud computing and digital platforms. These dynamics do not mark a rupture from capitalism but rather its latest mutation, in which market domination is achieved through the mechanisms of monopoly, not feudal hierarchy.
By debunking the techno-feudalism myth, this article seeks to redirect the critique toward the enduring structures of capitalist domination that continue to define the digital economy. Understanding Big Tech as capitalist titans, rather than digital lords, offers a more precise analytical lens for grasping the mechanisms of exploitation, accumulation, and control that shape the contemporary political economy of platforms.
Feudalism vs. Capitalism: The Essential Difference in Control Mechanisms
To understand why techno-feudalism is a misleading term, it is crucial to examine the fundamental differences between feudalism and capitalism. Feudalism was an economic and social system based on land ownership and coercive labor relations. Under this system, surplus value was extracted through extra-economy with political coercion, where lords exercised military and legal power to control serfs, who were legally bound to the land and had no economic freedom (Wood, 2002).
Capitalism, on the other hand, relies on economic mechanisms to control labor and generate surplus value. In capitalism, exploitation occurs through the wage system and labor markets, where workers are formally free but are structurally compelled to sell their labor power in order to survive. Marx (1867/1990) in Capital Volume I explains that capitalism exploits labor not through direct political coercion, as in feudalism, but through economic mechanisms such as productivity, efficiency, competition, profit oriented, and control over the means of production.
Table 01. Key Differences Between Feudal and Capitalist Economies
Dimention | Feudalism | Capitalism |
Basis of the System | Land ownership and hereditary status | Private ownership of capital and means of production |
Mode of Surplus Extraction | Extra-economic coercion (military/legal power) | Economic exploitation through wage labor and market mechanisms |
Form of Labor Control | Legal and personal bondage (e.g., serfdom) | Structural dependence through the labor market and wage relation |
Worker Status | Legally bound to land and lord | Legally free, but economically compelled to sell labor power |
Role of Coercion | Direct political coercion (laws, military force) | Indirect economic coercion (need to survive in market society) |
Freedom of Movement | Severely restricted | Formally guaranteed, though limited by economic necessity |
Means of Control | Feudal hierarchy and obligations | Contracts, property rights, competition, productivity, and efficiency |
In the digital capitalist economy, Big Tech does not exercise direct political coercion over workers or users. Instead, it creates an economic ecosystem that compels participation. For instance, gig workers on platforms like Uber or Gojek are not legally bound to these companies, yet they are heavily dependent on them due to algorithmic management and digital labor market structures (Woodcock & Graham, 2019; Novianto, 2024). Similarly, social media users are not forced to engage with platforms like Facebook or YouTube, but the design of these platforms and their monopoly over digital communication infrastructures leave users with few viable alternatives. This form of control鈥攕tructural dependence rather than legal coercion鈥攊s a hallmark of capitalism rather than feudalism.
Digital Capitalism: Monopolies and Rent Mechanisms
One of the central claims of techno-feudalism proponents is that digital corporations no longer rely on labor exploitation in the traditional sense but instead extract value primarily through rent-seeking based on data and digital infrastructure. In the digital economy, economic value is often generated not through the production of physical goods but through the control of networks, algorithms, and user data.
However, it is crucial to recognize that rent in the context of digital capitalism is not feudal rent but a new form of capitalist rent, enabled by digital monopolies. Srnicek (2017) in Platform Capitalism explains that Big Tech firms operate by controlling the digital infrastructures that underpin global economic activity. They create 鈥渨alled gardens鈥 where access to markets and services is tightly controlled, requiring participants to pay fees or share data as a form of rent.
Amazon, for example, does not only profit from e-commerce but also from cloud computing services (AWS), which dominate global computing infrastructure. Google and Meta generate massive profits from user data, which is converted into economic value through targeted advertising models. In traditional capitalism, profits are extracted directly from wage labor exploitation; in digital capitalism, profits are also extracted by controlling access to data and digital networks, creating a form of rent based on monopolistic control (Sadowski, 2020).
Beyond rent-seeking, another critical aspect of digital capitalism is its reliance on unpaid digital labor. Christian Fuchs (2014) in Digital Labor and Karl Marx argues that social media and digital platforms extract surplus value from users without directly compensating them. Unlike traditional wage labor, where surplus value is extracted through the exploitation of paid workers, digital platforms exploit users by monetizing their interactions, content creation, and engagement.
For instance, every post, comment, or video uploaded to platforms like Facebook or YouTube generates data that is sold to advertisers, creating profit for the platform while users receive no direct economic compensation. This form of value extraction is unique to digital capitalism but remains consistent with Marx鈥檚 broader critique of capitalism: surplus value is generated by controlling the means of production (in this case, digital infrastructures) and appropriating unpaid labor.
Why the Techno-Feudalism Narrative is Problematic
The narrative of techno-feudalism, while gaining traction in recent critical discourses, is deeply problematic both conceptually and politically. One of the central issues with this framework is that it obscures the underlying dynamics of capitalism itself. Referring to contemporary capitalism as a form of “neo-feudalism” risks misrepresenting the system鈥檚 inherent adaptability. As David Harvey (2005) argues in A Brief History of Neoliberalism, capitalism is not a static system鈥攊t evolves by generating new mechanisms of surplus extraction while preserving its foundational logic of capital accumulation. By labeling the current phase as feudal rather than capitalist, we may inadvertently overlook how these exploitative dynamics are not departures from capitalism but rather extensions of its logic under digital conditions.
Moreover, the techno-feudalism thesis tends to underplay the systemic tendency within capitalism toward monopoly formation. Characterizing Big Tech firms as “digital lords” ruling over users and workers evokes a historical analogy that ignores the long-standing critique of monopoly capitalism articulated by thinkers like Baran and Sweezy (1966). In their analysis, monopolistic structures are not anomalies but intrinsic outcomes of mature capitalist economies. The digital economy, with its heavy reliance on network effects and winner-takes-all dynamics, merely intensifies these tendencies, allowing dominant firms to consolidate control and shape economic life on an unprecedented scale.
Additionally, framing the current system as something beyond capitalism can dilute the force of anti-capitalist critique. If the prevailing system is no longer capitalism but a form of techno-feudalism, then the solution may be misconstrued as a return to a 鈥減urer鈥 or more 鈥渃ompetitive鈥 capitalism, rather than a radical transformation of its core structures. This misdirection risks legitimizing neoliberal reforms under the guise of restoring market fairness, rather than addressing the deeper contradictions of capitalist accumulation and class relations.
In sum, while the metaphor of techno-feudalism may offer rhetorical power, it ultimately distracts from a more rigorous analysis of how digital capitalism functions. Rather than suggesting a rupture from capitalism, the current moment should be understood as an intensification of capitalist logics鈥攑articularly in their monopolistic, exploitative, and state-supported forms.
Conclusion: Platform Capitalism, Not Techno-Feudalism
The current digital economy is best understood as a continuation of monopolistic capitalism rather than a new form of feudalism. Companies like Google, Amazon, and Meta do not create systems of unfreedom akin to feudalism but instead use capitalist mechanisms鈥攎onopoly power, data-driven rent-seeking, and unpaid digital labor鈥攖o accumulate wealth.
Rather than adopting the misleading term techno-feudalism, it is more accurate to analyze digital capitalism as an evolving system that amplifies traditional capitalist tendencies through new technological means. By recognizing the true nature of platform capitalism, we can develop more effective strategies to challenge Big Tech鈥檚 dominance and build a more democratic and equitable digital economy.
References
Baran, P. A., & Sweezy, P. M. (1966). Monopoly capital: An essay on the American economic and social order. Monthly Review Press.
Fuchs, C. (2014). Digital labor and Karl Marx. Routledge.
Harvey, D. (2005). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford University Press.
Marx, K. (1990). Capital: Volume I. Penguin Classics. (Original work published 1867)
Morozov, E. (2022). Critique of techno-feudal reason. New Left Review, (133), 89-126.
Novianto, A. (2024). Gamification From Below as by Form of Resistance: Algorithm Control, Precarity, and Resistance Dynamic of Indonesian Gig Workers. New Technology, Work and Employment.
Sadowski, J. (2020). Too smart: How digital capitalism is extracting data, controlling our lives, and taking over the world. MIT Press.
Srnicek, N. (2017). Platform capitalism. Polity Press.
Varoufakis, Y. (2021). Techno-feudalism: What killed capitalism?. Bodley Head.
Wood, E. M. (1999). The origin of capitalism: A longer view. Verso.
Woodcock, J., & Graham, M. (2019). The gig economy: A critical introduction. Polity Press.
Arif Novianto is a researcher at Institute of Governance and Public Affairs, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia. .